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1333 
PREARRAIGNMENT LINEUP PROCEDURES: ARE MULTIPLE 
LINEUPS UNDULY SUGGESTIVE OR SUFFICIENTLY 
RELIABLE? 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
BRONX COUNTY 
People v. Sharp1 
(decided April 11, 2012) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pretrial identification procedures are critical stages of the 
criminal prosecution process.2  In some cases, a defendant’s guilt or 
innocence may rest entirely on an eyewitness’s identification.3  
Therefore, it is imperative that criminal defendants are afforded con-
stitutional safeguards, such as the right to counsel and due process of 
law4—to ensure that identification procedures are conducted fairly.  
This case note will explore concerns raised in the context of sugges-
tive pretrial lineup procedures.  More specifically, this case note will 
address the issue presented in People v. Sharp—whether conducting 
a second lineup, a year after the first one was held, will create an un-
duly suggestive identification.  Case law supports the finding that it is 
not unduly suggestive to conduct a second lineup in such a scenario. 
 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Sharp was charged with robbery in the second degree as well 
 
1 942 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 2012). 
2 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967). 
3 See, e.g., Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d 779 (inferring that the case against the defendant would 
fall apart without an identification of him); People v. Wilson, 641 N.Y.S.2d 846, 849 (App. 
Div. 2d Dep’t 1996) (explaining how testimony about a lineup was the only evidence linking 
defendant to the crime). 
4 See infra Section IV. 
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as other related charges.5  It was alleged that Sharp forcibly stole the 
complainant’s belt and inflicted physical injury upon him in doing 
so.6  At the police station the next day, the complainant selected the 
defendant’s photo out of several photos shown to him from the New 
York City Police Department’s photo manager system.7  Although 
Sharp’s attorney notified the police that he was being represented on 
the pending matter, a lineup procedure was conducted in his attor-
ney’s absence and without her knowledge.8  Sharp was identified by 
the complainant in the lineup.9 
The initial pretrial lineup procedure in this action was consti-
tutionally defective, as it was conducted in violation of the defend-
ant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.10  Accordingly, that viola-
tion was sufficient to warrant the suppression of the lineup evidence, 
a notion to which the People conceded.11  But instead of attempting to 
establish that the witness had a source, independent from the unlaw-
ful lineup, which would have permitted him to make an in-court iden-
tification, the People sought to have the defendant appear in a second 
lineup.12  Defense counsel, in opposition to the People’s request for a 
second lineup, argued that placing Sharp in another lineup would be 
unduly suggestive and have a deleterious effect on the reliability of 
the identification.13 
The court in Sharp acknowledged that pre-arraignment 
lineups, occurring prior to the initiation of formal prosecutorial pro-
ceedings, do not invoke the right to counsel.14  However, where the 
police are notified that a defendant has legal representation, that de-
fendant’s right to counsel attaches immediately.15  But here, the vio-
lation of Sharp’s right to counsel was an issue of minor concern.  The 
real issue turned on whether the first lineup would have any prejudi-
cial effect on ordering a second lineup.  Further, the court needed to 
 
5 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 780. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 781. 
9 Id.  
10 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 781. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 782. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 781 (citing People v. Chipp, 552 N.E.2d 608 (N.Y. 1990)); see also People v. 
Hernandez, 517 N.E.2d 1328, 1330 (N.Y. 1987) (“There is no Federal or State constitutional 
right to counsel for an accused at a preindictment lineup.”). 
15 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 781. 
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determine whether the witness had an independent source of identifi-
cation.16  Prior to allowing a second lineup, the court ordered that a 
hearing be conducted to determine whether the first lineup was con-
ducted fairly and whether the complainant had an independent source 
with which to make a proper identification in the proposed second 
lineup.17 
III. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS IN PEOPLE V. SHARP 
Sharp presents an issue of first impression, in which the Peo-
ple urged the court to place the defendant in a second pretrial lineup 
rather than simply let the witness make an in-court identification.18  
But as the only ground for suppression of the initial identification 
procedure was a violation of defendant’s right to counsel, the People 
contended that another lineup—this time in the presence of counsel—
would not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.19  A similar situation, 
explained in Sharp, was presented in People v. Robinson.20  In Robin-
son, the defendant’s conviction was reversed on appeal because the 
identification evidence used at trial was procured from lineup proce-
dures conducted after an unlawful arrest.21  In the retrial, however, as 
per the People’s request, the court ordered a second set of lineups 
which yielded the same positive identifications as the former 
lineups.22  On the retrial, the People established that the witnesses had 
an independent source, separate from the lineup, sufficient to identify 
the defendant.23  The new identifications were admitted into evidence 
and the defendant was again found guilty.24  The First Department 
upheld the trial court’s finding that the new lineups were not unduly 
suggestive and that the witnesses’ observations from the crime estab-
lished an independent source for their identifications.25 
The court in Sharp pointed out that in Robinson, after the se-
 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 785. 
18 See id. at 782. 
19 See id. 
20 778 N.Y.S.2d 151 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2004). 
21 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 782 (stating that defendant was arrested without probable 
cause) (citing People v. Robinson, 728 N.Y.S.2d 421 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2001)). 
22 Id. (citing Robinson, 778 N.Y.S.2d  at 152). 
23 Robinson, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 152. 
24 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 782 (citing Robinson, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 152). 
25 Id. (citing Robinson, 778 N.Y.S.2d at 152). 
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cond trial ended, the defendant claimed that the new identifications 
were unduly suggestive, that the witnesses remembered him from 
both the first trial and from the initial lineups conducted prior to it, 
and therefore, the court should have suppressed the new identifica-
tions.26  But in Sharp, the defendant sought to prevent the second 
lineup from even occurring.27  Sharp argued that “permitting the 
complainant to view him again, after seeing his photograph in the 
computer, and after viewing him in the lineup, would in and of itself 
be impermissibly suggestive and would undermine the reliability of 
any resulting identification.”28  The court ultimately affirmed the de-
fendant’s conviction in Robinson based on two grounds: (1) that the 
lineup procedures were not suggestive, and (2) that the witnesses had 
an independent source with which to identify the defendant.29  The 
court in Sharp relied on these two grounds as necessary requirements 
for ordering a second lineup.  The only notable difference in the two 
cases is that in Robinson, the defendant made no challenge to the trial 
court’s order for a second lineup, whereas in Sharp, the defendant di-
rectly opposed the People’s request for a second lineup.30  This minor 
difference was insufficient to distinguish Robinson from Sharp, and 
therefore, instead of denying the People’s request, the court was cor-
rect to order a hearing to determine the fairness of the first lineup and 
whether the victim had an independent source to make an identifica-
tion for a second one. 
Foster v. California31 was a United States Supreme Court 
case involving identifications made by a sole witness to a robbery.32  
The first procedure in Foster (a lineup) was suggestive because the 
two other participants were significantly shorter in height than the de-
fendant was and the defendant was the only one wearing a conspicu-
ous leather jacket, similar to the one worn by the robber.33  The se-
cond procedure was objectionable because it was a one-on-one 
confrontation.34  The final procedure was a five-man lineup, in which 
 
26 Id. (citing Robinson v. Miller, No. 05 Civ. 4496, 2010 WL 1685552, at *1, *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2010) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 782. 
30 Id. 
31 394 U.S. 440 (1969). 
32 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 782 (citing Foster, 394 U.S. 440). 
33 Foster, 394 U.S. at 441. 
34 Id. 
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the defendant was the only person who had appeared in the first 
lineup.35  The Court ultimately found the identification procedures 
conducted in Foster to be unduly suggestive.36 
Foster was cited by defense counsel in Sharp to support the 
proposition that a second lineup would be impermissibly suggestive 
and undermine reliability of the potential identification.37  But in Fos-
ter, there were three separate identification procedures, each of which 
the court found to be independently suggestive.38  Moreover, the wit-
ness in Foster admitted to being uncertain about two out of the three 
identifications that he made, whereas in Sharp there was no indica-
tion of any witness uncertainty.39  Sharp made it clear that a court 
will not find that identification procedures are unduly suggestive 
simply because more than one of them have been implemented.40 
The court in Sharp also noted that the People have a statutory 
right to request that the court order a defendant to appear in a 
lineup.41  The court ruled that so long as the People can show that the 
prior lineup was not unduly suggestive and that the witness has an in-
dependent source to make an identification in another lineup, then 
“there is no constitutional rule prohibiting or any policy consideration 
militating against a second one.”42  The court further explained that a 
pretrial lineup will make an identification more reliable.43  Taking in-
to consideration that reliability plays such a major role in identifica-
tion procedures and evidence in general, the court in Sharp was not 
quick to exclude potentially reliable identification evidence. 
Perhaps the most influential case cited in Sharp was People v. 
Hawkins.44  Hawkins involved a consolidation of four criminal cases, 
each of which involved prearraignment lineups held in the absence of 
 
35 Id. at 441-42. 
36 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 782. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 782-83 (citing Foster, 394 U.S. at 443). 
39 Id. at 783. 
40 Id. at 782. 
41 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 785; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40(2)(b)(i) (McKin-
ney 2012) (providing in pertinent part: “Upon motion of  the  prosecutor, and subject to con-
stitutional limitation, the court in which an indictment . . . is pending: . . . (b) may order the  
defendant to provide non-testimonial evidence.  Such order may, among other things, require 
the defendant to: (i) [a]ppear in a line-up . . .”). 
42 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 785. 
43 Id. 
44 435 N.E.2d 376 (N.Y. 1982). 
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counsel.45  Defendants in all four cases in Hawkins were identified at 
their respective lineups and the court ruled every identification ad-
missible in court.46  The underlying rule of law was that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel does not afford protection to a suspect at 
an investigatory lineup conducted before he is formally charged with 
a crime.47  Furthermore, as stated in Sharp, the policy behind this rule 
is clear: “even without counsel present,” corporeal lineups generally 
effectuate reliable identification procedures, so long as no part of the 
lineup is unduly suggestive.48  That is to say, absence of counsel at a 
lineup does not imply suggestiveness per se.  The court in Sharp even 
went as far to say that compared to the important role of counsel at a 
custodial interrogation, counsel’s role at a lineup is limited, passive, 
and “even insignificant.”49  Thus, the court in Sharp was correct to 
further inquire into the fairness of the lineup itself and not to deny a 
second lineup based solely on a right to counsel violation. 
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
Eyewitness unreliability is a known problem inherent in cases 
involving identification procedures, as it can often result in misidenti-
fication and a potential wrongful conviction.50  For this reason, many 
constitutional safeguards exist to militate against the risk of misiden-
tification in criminal proceedings. 
 
 
45 Id. at 378. 
46 Id. at 379. 
47 Id. 
48 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 784. 
49 Id. at 783 (quoting People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894 (N.Y. 1976). 
50 See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE–VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION 527-32 (Matthew Bender et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010) 
(discussing police conduct at lineups, wrongful convictions due to misidentification, and the 
“inherent unreliability of human perception and memory . . .”); Gary L. Wells & Eric P. 
Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 765 (1995) [hereinafter Eyewitness Identification] (discussing 
dangers inherent in lineup procedures and recommendations for averting the problem); Don-
ald P. Judges, ARTICLE: Two Cheers for the Department of Justice's Eyewitness Evidence: 
A Guide for Law Enforcement, 53 ARK. L. REV. 231 (2000). 
6
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 4, Art. 18
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/18
2013] PREARRAIGNMENT LINEUP PROCEDURES 1339 
A Right to Counsel as a Safeguard Against Unfair 
Identification 
The Supreme Court established in United States v. Wade51 
that because a pretrial lineup is a “critical stage” of the criminal pros-
ecution, a defendant is entitled to a right to counsel at all post-
indictment (or post-arraignment) lineups.52  Allowing defense coun-
sel to observe the lineup procedure gives him the opportunity, should 
the need arise, “to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred at 
the lineup.”53  There is no doubt that within the context of pretrial 
identification, the possibility of suggestibility is immanent;54 the 
Court in Wade clarified: 
[E]ven though cross-examination is a precious safe-
guard to a fair trial, it cannot be viewed as an absolute 
assurance of accuracy and reliability.  Thus in the pre-
sent context, where so many variables and pitfalls ex-
ist, the first line of defense must be the prevention of 
unfairness and the lessening of the hazards of eyewit-
ness identification at the lineup itself.  The trial which 
might determine the accused’s fate may well not be 
that in the courtroom but that at the pretrial confronta-
tion, with the State aligned against the accused, the 
witness the sole jury, and the accused unprotected 
against the overreaching, intentional or unintentional, 
and with little or no effective appeal from the judg-
ment there rendered by the witness-‘that’s the man.’55 
In Wade, the Court held that the defendant’s right to counsel was vio-
lated at the post-indictment lineup, and therefore, vacated his convic-
tion.56  It was evident from the Court’s rationale in Wade that the po-
tential suggestiveness of pretrial lineups was an issue of major 
concern.57  To militate against unreliable and unfair identifications, 
 
51 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
52 Id. at 240-41. 
53 Id. at 231-32. 
54 Id. at 235. 
55 Id. at 235-36. 
56 Wade, 388 U.S. at 221. 
57 Id. at 233 (listing several examples of suggestive procedures which the right to counsel 
is intended to safeguard against: (1) where all participants in the lineup, but the suspect, were 
known to the witness; (2) where the other participants are dissimilar in appearance to the 
suspect; (3) where the suspect was the only person in the lineup required to wear the same 
7
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the rule from Wade and its companion case, Gilbert v. California,58 
(more commonly known as the Wade-Gilbert rule) requires the ex-
clusion of identification evidence which was tainted by lineups con-
ducted in the absence of counsel.59 
Relating back to People v. Sharp, where the defendant’s right 
to counsel was violated when the police conducted a lineup in coun-
sel’s absence, the evidence from that lineup was rightfully sup-
pressed.60  But if a second lineup were to take place after the court-
ordered Wade hearing,61 then the defendant would have access to 
counsel, and thus, be safeguarded from any potential unfairness.62   
B Due Process and Reliability 
Along with the right to counsel as a defense against the inher-
ent dangers of identifications, the Due Process Clause also exists as a 
safeguard for criminal defendants.63  The protections afforded by the 
Due Process Clause require exclusion of identification evidence upon 
the defendant’s showing that a procedure was unnecessarily sugges-
tive and that there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable misiden-
tification.64 
In Stovall v. Denno,65 the Court acknowledged that unneces-
sarily suggestive identification confrontations are violative of due 
process, thus requiring suppression.66  As illustrated in Neil v. 
 
distinctive clothing allegedly worn by the culprit; (4) where the witness is told by the police 
that they have caught the culprit just before showing the suspect to the witness; (5) where the 
police point out the suspect either prior to or during the lineup and; (6) where the other par-
ticipants wear clothing that fits only the suspect). 
58 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
59 See Wade, 388 U.S. 218; Gilbert, 388 U.S. 263. 
60 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 781. 
61 See People v. Chipp, 552 N.E.2d 608, 614 (N.Y. 1990) (“The purpose and function of a 
Wade hearing is to determine whether a police-arranged pretrial identification procedure 
such as a lineup, was unduly suggestive.”). 
62 See infra Section V (discussing a solution to the issues that arise when a witness is said 
to have remembered a defendant from a previous lineup). 
63 See Foster, 394 U.S. 440 (reversing defendant’s conviction on the ground that the iden-
tification procedure was violative of due process). 
64 Id. at 442; see also Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (holding that 
right to due process protects against suggestive identification procedures that create “a very 
substantial likelihood of misidentification”). 
65 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
66 Id. at 301-02 (holding, however, that “a claimed violation of due process of law in the 
conduct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it”).  
The Court ultimately held that after a fatal stabbing, it was not improper to show the accused 
8
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Biggers,67 pursuant to federal law, even if it is established that an 
identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, such evidence 
may nevertheless be admissible if it is reliable.68  Reliability will be-
come an issue of a court’s concern, however, only after a defendant 
has proven that a procedure was unnecessarily suggestive.69  In other 
words, admissibility of evidence depends on its reliability. 
For instance, the victim in Biggers was attacked inside her 
home and then taken out to the woods at knifepoint and raped.70  
Over the next several months, the victim viewed suspects at her 
home, at the police station, and in photographs, but did not identify 
the perpetrator.71  Seven months after the attack, the police conducted 
a show-up identification, in which two police officers walked the de-
fendant past the victim.72  At the pretrial hearing, the victim identified 
the individual as the man who raped her, expressing that she remem-
bered his face from the night of the crime.73  This was more than suf-
ficient to establish an independent source, despite the suggestive 
show-up procedure.74  In determining whether the show-up was ad-
missible, the Court focused its analysis on reliability as opposed to 
suggestiveness because, after all, “it is the likelihood of misidentifi-
cation which violates a defendant’s right to due process,” and reliable 
evidence tends to reduce the chance of misidentification.75  The Court 
stressed the significance of the witness maintaining a good record for 
reliability over the course of seven months—after seeing multiple 
lineups, photographs, and presumably suggestive show-ups, she made 
 
to the victim in her hospital room for identification because the show-up was not unneces-
sary, but imperative under the circumstances.  Id. at 302. 
67 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
68 Id. at 201 (holding that reliable identification evidence may be admissible despite it be-
ing unnecessarily suggestive); but see People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383-84 (N.Y. 
1981) (maintaining that New York State law requires a per se exclusion of all evidence pro-
cured from unnecessarily suggestive procedures, regardless of how reliable it is). 
69 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 202 (“[I]dentification obtained as a result of an unnecessarily sug-
gestive [procedure] may still be introduced in evidence if, under the ‘totality of the circum-
stances’, the identification retains strong indicia of reliability.”); see also Perry v. New 
Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 719 (2012) (stating that “[t]he due process check for reliabil-
ity . . . comes into play only after the defendant establishes improper police conduct”). 
70 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 193-94. 
71 Id. at 194-95. 
72 Id. at 195. 
73 Id. at 195-96. 
74 Id. at 200. 
75 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198, 201 (holding that because there was “no substantial likelihood 
of misidentification . . . the evidence was properly allowed to go to the jury”). 
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no incorrect identification.76  The very first identification, albeit un-
der suggestive circumstances, was made during the witness’s encoun-
ter with the defendant at the police station.77  The Court found per-
suasive the fact that this witness did not succumb to any of the prior 
inherently suggestive procedures, and ultimately it held that evidence 
of the defendant’s identification was reliable and properly allowed to 
go to the jury.78 
Using this “totality of the circumstances” analysis in Biggers, 
the Supreme Court found the identification “reliable even though the 
confrontation procedure was suggestive.”79  The five factors applied 
by the Court to evaluate the likelihood of misidentification, known as 
the Biggers factors, are: 
[1] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal 
at the time of the crime, [2] the witness’ degree of at-
tention, [3] the accuracy of the witness’ prior descrip-
tion of the criminal, [4] the level of certainty demon-
strated by the witness at the confrontation, and [5] the 
length of time between the crime and the confronta-
tion.80 
It is noteworthy however, that the federal “totality of the circum-
stances” approach provides for less stringent boundaries than those 
applied in New York State with respect to admissibility of identifica-
tion evidence.81 
The Supreme Court explained in Manson v. Brathwaite82 that, 
“reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identifi-
 
76 Id. at 201. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 200-01 (stating that the victim saw her assailant for a considerable period of time 
under adequate light and provided the police with a detailed description of him months be-
fore the show-up). 
79 Id. at 199. 
80 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200. 
81 Compare Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199 (utilizing the totality of the circumstances approach 
to allow reliable identification evidence procured from a suggestive procedure), with People 
v. Racine, No. 4132-09, 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3843, at *1, *17-18 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 
2010) (excluding identification evidence that was procured from an unnecessarily suggestive 
procedure, despite its reliability).  Due process protection in New York, discussed in further 
detail below, is more restrictive and requires a per se exclusion of evidence procured from an 
unnecessarily suggestive procedure.  See id.  Reliability of evidence, therefore, has more 
weight in terms of admissibility in federal court than in New York State court.  See id. 
82 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
10
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cation testimony.”83  In Brathwaite, after an undercover policeman 
purchased drugs from the defendant, he went back to the station and 
gave a physical description of the dealer to another police officer.84  
A few days later, the undercover officer identified the defendant by 
looking at the single photograph of him, which was left on his desk 
by the other officer.85  Although this was a highly suggestive alterna-
tive to the preferred method of photographic identification—a photo 
array consisting of multiple photos86—the Court held the identifica-
tion admissible after evaluating the Biggers factors.87  In Brathwaite, 
the Court’s profound reluctance to exclude reliable and relevant evi-
dence, despite its suggestive nature, was just as evident in Biggers, 
and thus, demonstrated the less stringent boundaries to admissibility 
in federal court with respect to identification procedures.  The Su-
preme Court recently upheld the standard that the ability of a witness 
to make an accurate identification must be outweighed by the cor-
rupting effect of the challenged identification in order to ensure its 
exclusion from evidence.88 
Perry v. New Hampshire89 was a recent Supreme Court case 
that ruled on the issue of whether the Due Process Clause requires a 
preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an unnecessarily 
suggestive eyewitness identification when suggestive circumstances 
were not arranged by the police.90  The Court explained that when the 
police use suggestive conduct during an identification procedure, the 
court must screen the evidence for reliability before trial.91  If the 
court finds that the likelihood of misidentification is high, then it 
must exclude the evidence.92  If, however, reliability is found to 
“outweigh the corrupting effect of the police-arranged suggestive cir-
 
83 Id. at 114. 
84 Id. at 100, 101. 
85 Id. at 101. 
86 Id. at 117. 
87 Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114-16 (analyzing each factor: (1) the officer had ample oppor-
tunity to view the defendant; (2) the officer’s paid close attention to detail, as he was special-
ly trained to do so; (3) the description was accurate as to every physical characteristic de-
scribed; (4) the witness was absolutely certain that the person in the photograph was the drug 
dealer; and (5) the description of the dealer was given just minutes after the crime and the 
photographic identification happened only two days later). 
88 See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 725. 
89 132 S. Ct. 716. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 720. 
92 Id. 
11
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cumstances, the identification evidence . . . will be admitted, and the 
jury will ultimately determine its worth.”93 
In Perry, the defendant was charged with theft by unauthor-
ized taking and criminal mischief.94  He had allegedly broken into a 
vehicle in the parking lot of an apartment complex and stole two car 
stereo amplifiers.95  An eye-witness had watched this happen from 
the kitchen window of her fourth floor apartment and alerted the au-
thorities.96  While one police officer went inside to speak to the wit-
ness, another officer remained in the parking lot with the defendant.97  
When the officer upstairs asked the witness for a specific description 
of the man, she pointed out of her window and identified the thief as 
the man standing outside next to the other police officer.98  The Court 
ultimately held that because the suggestive nature of the witness’ 
identification was not actually manufactured by the police, a pre-
screening for reliability was not required.99  Relying heavily on 
Brathwaite, the Court here reiterated that the policy behind the rule 
excluding evidence from suggestive identification procedures is to 
“deter law enforcement use of improper lineups, show-ups, and photo 
arrays.”100  Logically, if the police did not use improper conduct, then 
enforcing the rule here would defeat its purpose.101 
An important underlying premise in Biggers, Brathwaite, and 
Perry is that in each case the Court gave due deference to a historical 
canon of our system of jurisprudence—allowing the jury to weigh the 
reliability of evidence, and not the judge.102  While in some situations 
it may be proper for a judge to perform a pretrial screen of evidence 
 
93 Id.; see United States ex rel. Moore v. Illinois, 577 F.2d 411, 413-14 (7th Cir. 1978) 
(explaining that a witness’s identification that was made under suggestive circumstances 
cannot be suppressed without further inquiry into the corrupting effect of the confrontation 
weighed against indicia of its reliability). 
94 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 722. 
95 Id. at 721. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 722. 
99 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 722. 
100 Id. at 726. 
101 Id. (stating that the deterrence rationale is inapposite in this case and cases like it, 
where the police do not engage in improper conduct). 
102 Id. at 723, 728-29; Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116 (“We are content to rely upon the good 
sense and judgment of American juries, for evidence with some element of untrustworthi-
ness is customary grist for the jury mill.  Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot meas-
ure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature.”). 
12
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to ensure that it is reliable,103 such a procedure is inappropriate when 
the jury is presented with evidence that the authorities did not them-
selves corrupt, as the jury can make a proper determination on its 
own.104 
V. NEW YORK STATE: SUGGESTIVE PROCEDURES 
New York State courts take a slightly different approach than 
the federal courts with respect to suggestive identification proce-
dures.  While the People must first establish that police conduct dur-
ing a procedure is reasonable and that it lacked suggestiveness,105 the 
ultimate burden of proof lies on the defendant to demonstrate that the 
procedure was unduly suggestive.106  Unnecessarily suggestive pro-
cedures in New York are likely to taint subsequent identifications, 
and on that basis such procedures are excluded per se, regardless of 
the reliability of the identification.107  This state approach departs 
from the precedent set forth in Brathwaite, much to the dismay of 
some New York judges, but sometimes may yield the same result.108  
The New York per se exclusion approach makes it quite difficult for 
the prosecution to get potentially reliable identifications admitted into 
evidence.  However, New York courts have always maintained this 
standard for admissibility, despite the more lenient approach pursuant 
to federal constitutional standards such as the ones applied in Biggers 
and Brathwaite.109 
 
103 See, e.g., Foster, 394 U.S. at 443 (excluding evidence from police-conducted identifi-
cation procedures that offended due process). 
104 Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728 (holding that “[t]he fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not, 
without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a trial court 
to screen such evidence for reliability before allowing the jury to assess its creditworthi-
ness”). 
105 People v. Jackson, 780 N.E.2d 162, 165 (N.Y. 2002). 
106 Chipp, 552 N.E.2d at 613; see also People v. Delamota, 960 N.E.2d 383, 390 (N.Y. 
2011) (stating that the defendant must prove that a police-arranged procedure was unneces-
sarily suggestive). 
107 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 383-84; see also Racine, 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3843, at *17-
18 (excluding evidence procured from an unnecessarily suggestive show-up procedure, de-
spite its potential reliability). 
108 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 384 (Cooke, J., concurring) (stating that the adoption of a per se 
exclusionary rule is contradictory if the court will still allow admission of evidence based on 
a harmless error analysis). 
109 See People v. Marte, 912 N.E.2d 37, 39 (N.Y. 2009) (stating that although the federal 
rule is different from the rule in New York, both rules share a common purpose—“to assure 
that ‘[t]he police will guard against unnecessarily suggestive procedures . . . for fear that 
their actions will lead to the exclusion of identifications as unreliable’ ”) (citing Brathwaite, 
13
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In People v. Riley,110 the New York Court of Appeals advised 
that: 
The complex psychological interplay and dependency 
of erroneously induced identification evidence via 
show-ups, lineups, various bolsterings and the like 
must be vigilantly guarded against because this kind of 
error drives right into the heart of the adjudicative 
guilt or innocence process affecting the person ac-
cused and identified.  Thus, constitutional, statutory 
and decisional safeguards have been erected essential-
ly to insure reliability of this most potent evidence.111 
The New York Court of Appeals places substantial weight on the 
idea that erroneous identifications lead to convictions of the innocent, 
thus the trial courts strenuously try to avoid this result.112 
In the matter of People v. Sharp, the court noted that corpore-
al lineups generally produce reliable identifications, with or without 
the presence of counsel.113  The defendant in Sharp contended that 
appearing in a second lineup would be suggestive, insofar as the wit-
ness would remember him from the last lineup.114  Case law, howev-
er, would support a contrary contention.  For instance, in People v. 
Racine115 the court held that a nine week interval between a sugges-
tive identification and a subsequent, fairly conducted lineup was suf-
ficient to “attenuate the taint” of the suggestive identification.116 
In Racine, an off-duty police officer witnessed the defendant, 
along with three young men, running down the street while firing a 
handgun.117  The witness distinctly remembered the race, height, and 
attire of the four men.118  Surveillance cameras caught them running 
down the street and into the elevator of an apartment building.119  
 
432 U.S. at 112). 
110 517 N.E.2d 520 (N.Y. 1987). 
111 Id. at 524 (citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 229). 
112 Id. 
113 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 784. 
114 Id. at 782. 
115 No. 4132-09, 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3843, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 2010). 
116 Id. at *26; see generally Joseph G. Casaccio, Illegally Acquired Information, Consent 
Searches, and Tainted Fruit, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 842, 845-46 (defining and explaining the 
effect of the attenuation principle). 
117 Racine, 2010 LEXIS 3843, at *3. 
118 Id. at *5, *7. 
119 Id. at *7-*8. 
14
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Later that evening, after ascertaining the defendant’s identity, the 
lead investigator had the witness view the videos of the men.120  
Showing the witness the videos was unnecessarily suggestive because 
he was able to recognize the men from the same conspicuous clothing 
and accessories that they were wearing just hours ago—the investiga-
tor could and should have first shown the witness the non-suggestive 
photo array instead of the videos.  But it was not until after the un-
necessarily suggestive identification that the investigator displayed to 
the witness a non-suggestive photo array, in which he identified the 
defendant.121 
About nine weeks later, the defendant voluntarily came to the 
station, where he was placed in a fairly conducted lineup, in which he 
was identified by the witness again.122  The defendant moved to have 
the witness’s testimony about the lineup identification suppressed, 
arguing that “the unnecessarily suggestive video surveillance identi-
fication tainted the immediately following photographic identifica-
tion, which, in-turn, tainted the lineup identification, which, in-turn 
would taint the prospective in-court identification at trial.”123  This 
argument failed however, as the court observed, “evidence may be 
admitted at trial if the causal connection between the identification 
evidence and the previously occurring unnecessarily suggestive . . .  
procedure has been so attenuated that the taint of the initial miscon-
duct has been dissipated.”124  The court held that a time period of nine 
weeks was sufficient to attenuate the taint of video surveillance iden-
tification.125 
If just a nine week time period was sufficient to attenuate the 
taint of a prior suggestive identification procedure, then a period of an 
entire year should certainly be sufficient to attenuate any taint created 
by viewing a lineup that was not suggestive to begin with.126  As 
 
120 Id. at *8-*9. 
121 Id. at *14-*16 (stating that the investigator had a separate photograph of the defendant, 
in which he was wearing entirely different clothing). 
122 Racine, 2010 LEXIS 3843, at *19-*20. 
123 Id. at *20. 
124 Id. at *21 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963); Nardone v. 
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). 
125 Racine, 2010 LEXIS 3843, at *26; see also People v. Sebok, 680 N.Y.S.2d 195, 195 
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1996) (noting that a second lineup occurring three and a half months 
after the first lineup was allowed even though, as in Sharp, the first lineup had minor irregu-
larities). 
126 See Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d 779.  Defense counsel mentioned in her motion papers that 
the witness had seen the defendant on a wanted poster and that the police had told him that 
15
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there have been many cases in New York in which additional lineups 
were directed by the court, claiming that a second lineup would cre-
ate undue suggestiveness would be a rather difficult argument to 
prove.127 
In People v. Collado,128 on appeal from conviction, defendant 
claimed that a lineup was unduly suggestive because the witness an-
ticipated his appearance in the lineup that took place after a photo-
graphic identification.129  The court acknowledged that most witness-
es “intuitively anticipate that the lineup will include [the person that 
was previously identified].”130  As long as a witness is not informed 
by authorities that the suspect would be participating in the lineup, 
the court held that the lineup itself was not unduly suggestive.131  If 
such a lineup would undermine reliability or offend due process, it 
would not have been admissible.132  Further, the Second Department 
has held that authorities may use more than one pretrial identification 
procedure, as long as all of them are fairly conducted and non-
suggestive.133 
Apart from the per se exclusionary rule in New York, pretrial 
lineups generally follow the same standards set forth by the federal 
approach.  In cases where identification evidence was ruled inadmis-
sible due to suggestiveness, such as in People v. Allah,134 the sugges-
tive conduct or behavior is usually blatantly obvious and rightfully 
suppressed.135  In Allah, the defendant was placed in a lineup, in 
 
he had chosen the right guy after each identification; however, it seems that counsel lacks 
factual basis to support these claims.  Id. at 782 n.3.  The court expressed doubt that the de-
fendant’s claim would have any merit.  See also People v. Wallace, 706 N.Y.S.2d 539 (App. 
Div. 4th Dep’t) (noting that it is permissible for the same witness who viewed a photo array 
to view a subsequent lineup; a lineup held five months after the photo array “is sufficiently 
attenuated in time to nullify any taint even if the photo array was suggestive”). 
127 See, e.g., People v. Hammonds, 768 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (holding that a wit-
ness who has been shown a photo array may subsequently identify the defendant from a line 
up). 
128 794 N.Y.S.2d 560 (App. Term 2005). 
129 Id. at 563. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Cf. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 50, at 538 (stating that it is rare for trial courts 
to find that an identification procedure offended due process; usually both pretrial and in-
court identifications are permitted). 
133 See People v. Carter, 482 N.Y.S.2d 911, 914 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1984) (holding that a 
witness’s viewing of two photographic arrays did not taint a subsequent lineup and none of 
the procedures were unduly suggestive). 
134 646 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (Nassau Cnty. Ct. 1996). 
135 Id. at 1014 (holding that use of one conspicuously colored placard, held by defendant, 
16
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which he selected to stand as participant number two.136  At the Wade 
hearing, it was determined that defendant’s placard was orange while 
the placards held by the other five fillers were all light yellow.137  The 
hearing court held this to be highly suggestive and suppressed the re-
sulting identifications.138  Notwithstanding the court’s ruling, the 
People moved to have the defendant appear in a second lineup.139  
Based on the fact that it would allow the People to “circumvent” the 
court’s ruling and gain an opportunity to re-litigate an issue that was 
already tried and decided upon, the court denied the People’s applica-
tion for a second lineup.140 
In New York State, any evidence obtained from suggestive 
identification procedures must be suppressed.141  In addition to Ra-
cine and Allah, there are a multitude of cases that involve the sup-
pression of identification evidence derived from suggestive proce-
dures.142  But none of those cases, nor any other cases in New York, 
have ever held that it would be suggestive for a witness to view a de-
fendant in a second lineup solely on the basis that that witness identi-
fied him in a prior procedure. 
 
as opposed to a different color from the other placards was highly suggestive); see also Peo-
ple v. Breitenbach, 687 N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1999) (holding that a lineup 
was unduly suggestive when a thin, blond haired suspect was placed in a lineup with five 
fillers who had dark hair and hefty builds). 
136 Allah, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 1014. 
137 Id. 
138 Id.  It was further determined by the court that the placards placed in evidence by the 
People were different from the ones actually used at the lineup, thus demonstrating that the 
People attempted to cover up the suggestive conduct.  Id. at 1015-16. 
139 Id. at 1014. 
140 Allah, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 1016. 
141 Adams, 423 N.E.2d at 384 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that suggestive pretrial identifications 
have never been admissible). 
142 See, e.g., People v. Tatum, 492 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding lineup 
unduly suggestive when defendant was the only participant with a glass eye); People v. 
Gaddy, 496 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496-97 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1985) (suppressing lineup where de-
fendant was visibly dissimilar in age and appearance); People v. Tindal, 418 N.Y.S.2d 815, 
816 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1979) (suppressing lineup identification due to prior suggestive 
photo identification); People v. Burwell, 258 N.E.2d 714, 715-16 (N.Y. 1970) (suppressing 
lineup when the suspect was placed only with fillers twice his age); cf. People v. Washing-
ton, 837 N.Y.S.2d 272, 273 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2007) (denying motion to suppress a lineup 
where fillers were similar in appearance to the defendant). 
17
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VI. PEOPLE V. SHARP: THE WADE HEARING 
A. Suggestiveness 
To reiterate, the court in Sharp ordered a Wade/independent 
source hearing to take place in order to determine whether the initial 
lineup procedure was unduly suggestive and whether the witness had 
an independent source to identify the defendant in the proposed se-
cond lineup.143  This is common practice in New York because it sets 
the stage for a more reliable in-court identification at trial; whenever 
the fairness of an identification procedure is called into question, it is 
customary to hold a Wade hearing prior to trial to determine whether 
there is an independent source.144  Should the hearing court in Sharp 
find that the former lineup procedure was fairly conducted and that 
the witness has an independent source, then the court should grant the 
People’s application for a second lineup.145  The new lineup must be 
conducted in a fashion that is consistent with constitutional stand-
ards.146  As is always the case with evidence, relevancy is a prerequi-
site to admissibility, and therefore, identification evidence is subject 
to the court’s balancing test to determine whether its probative value 
is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.147  In Sharp, it would appear 
 
143 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 785. 
144 People v. Burts, 574 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (N.Y. 1991) (citing People v. Dodt, 462 
N.E.2d 1159, 1165 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that an eye-witness’s independent source to make 
an in-court identification must be determined pretrial and not post-trial)). 
145 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 780. 
146 See Chipp, 552 N.E.2d at 612-13, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 833 (1990) (holding that while 
show-up procedures are strongly disfavored, corporeal lineups are reliable and sufficient, as 
long as there is no undue suggestiveness).  The court did not, however, specify which type of 
corporeal lineup to use.  See id.  The traditional procedure is the simultaneous lineup, in 
which all participants are shown together and side-by-side; however, newer procedures have 
been implemented such as the sequential lineup, in which each participant is viewed sepa-
rately, one at a time.  See Hammonds, 768 N.Y.S.2d at 170 (discussing the benefits of dou-
ble-blind lineup procedures); see generally Wells, supra note 50, at 772 (comparing the ef-
fects of sequential lineups with those of simultaneous lineups). 
147 See People v. Davis, 371 N.E.2d 456, 460 (N.Y. 1977) 
Relevance, however, is not always enough, since ‘even if the evidence is 
proximately relevant, it may be rejected if its probative value is out-
weighed by the danger that its admission would prolong the trial to an 
unreasonable extent without any corresponding advantage; or would 
confuse the main issue and mislead the jury; or unfairly surprise a party; 
or create substantial danger of undue prejudice to one of the parties’. 
Id.  New York State has not adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence—it still uses the com-
18
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that no prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value of straight-
forward eye-witness testimony offered to prove the identity of the de-
fendant. 
As discussed in the above sections, there are many circum-
stances in which an identification procedure may be deemed sugges-
tive, but none of those cases involve a situation like the one in Sharp.  
The Supreme Court has firmly held that to warrant suppression, a 
lineup procedure must be “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive 
to irreparable mistaken identification” that it deprived the defendant 
of due process of law.148  The defendant in Sharp sought to preclude a 
second lineup procedure on the grounds that it could be unnecessarily 
suggestive; however, nothing about the second lineup—which has yet 
to occur—can be said to have violated due process. 
B. Independent Source 
There must be a phase at the pending Wade hearing, during 
which the court will assess the reliability of the witness’s identifica-
tion to determine whether he had an independent source, separate and 
distinct from the lineup encounter.149  The prosecution in Sharp, as 
the court pointed out, has taken a risk by requesting that their witness 
view another lineup because if he is unable to identify the defendant, 
then there can be no in-court identification at all.150  Normally if a 
lineup is suppressed due to a violation of the right to counsel, the 
witness may still be permitted to make an in-court identification of 
the defendant.151  In this situation, a witness may only identify a de-
fendant in court if the identification is supported by an independent 
source.152  Here, however, if no identification is made at the proposed 
 
mon law as authority for evidentiary matters.  The Federal Rules of Evidence counterpart 
here would be the rules on relevancy.  See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude rele-
vant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of 
the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wast-
ing time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). 
148 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02. 
149 See People v. Foster, 613 N.Y.S.2d 616, 619 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1994) (holding that 
it is essential to assess the reliability of a witness’s identification to make an independent 
source finding). 
150 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 784. 
151 See generally People v. Bouchereau, 681 N.Y.S.2d 50 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1998) 
(holding that witness’s in-court identification was admissible despite the suppression of the 
lineup evidence). 
152 Id. (citing Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 119 (“[I]n-court identification following an uncoun-
seled lineup was allowable only if the prosecution could clearly and convincingly demon-
19
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second lineup, the People will likely be estopped from making an in-
dependent source argument.153  In other words, if the witness fails to 
identify the defendant in a lineup, then that same witness could not 
possibly claim that he remembers his assailant from the crime.  The 
People also could have avoided a second lineup altogether and used 
only the witness’s independent source for an in-court identification—
a strategy which would have eliminated lineup evidence entirely and 
most definitely weakened their case. 
The applicable New York state precedent demonstrates that 
after showing a lack of suggestiveness, the People normally need not 
prove anything else at a Wade hearing.154  If, however, a procedure is 
deemed unduly suggestive, the People must then prove by “clear and 
convincing evidence” that the witness has an independent source—a 
showing of which would permit only an in-court identification, not 
additional identification evidence such as that from a lineup.155  The 
Wade hearing in Sharp will be slightly different because the court or-
dered the hearing for the purpose of determining both the fairness of 
the lineup and whether the witness had an independent source, re-
gardless of whether suggestiveness is shown.156  The court, in order-
ing a hearing to resolve each of these issues, appropriately admon-
ished the government for not following proper procedure the first 
time around.157 
One of Sharp’s main arguments is that a second lineup would 
undermine the reliability of any resulting identification.158  The New 
York Court of Appeals, however, has previously ruled on this par-
ticular issue of reliability in People v. Bolden,159 stating that 
As a general proposition, negative identification evi-
dence will be relevant in certain circumstances.  When 
the reliability of an eyewitness identification is at is-
 
strate that it was not tainted by the constitutional violation.”)); see generally Neil v. Biggers, 
409 U.S. 188 (recognizing the independent source as the victim’s recollection of the assault). 
153 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 784. 
154 Chipp, 552 N.E.2d at 613. 
155 Id. 
156 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 785. 
157 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 621 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1995) (“It is 
well settled that even where an identification procedure is the product of a suggestive pretrial 
identification procedure, a witness will nonetheless be permitted to identify a defendant in 
court if that identification is based on an independent source.”). 
158 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 782. 
159 445 N.E.2d 198, 199 (N.Y. 1982) (Gabrielli, J., concurring). 
20
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sue, negative identification evidence can tend to prove 
that the eyewitness possessed the ability to distinguish 
the particular features of the perpetrator.  Furthermore, 
it may also be useful in demonstrating that the eyewit-
ness was unwilling simply to select anyone offered to 
him by the police.  The common lineup, a fundamental 
part of the criminal identification process, unquestion-
ably involves a form of negative identification evi-
dence inasmuch as the selection by the eyewitness is 
evaluated in conjunction with his failure to identify the 
other participants in the lineup.160 
In Bolden, a police officer was permitted to testify about how he dis-
played to the eyewitness a “blank” photo array, in which the defend-
ant was not pictured.161  He explained that despite the blank photo ar-
ray, the eyewitness did not mistakenly identify any of the fillers.162  
The court essentially defined this non-identification as “negative 
identification evidence.”163  The court explained that negative identi-
fication evidence is relevant and often reliable evidence, which tends 
to demonstrate the eyewitness’s “ability to distinguish the particular 
features of the perpetrator” from the other lineup participants.164  By 
making a positive identification of the suspect, the witness also 
demonstrates his initiative to not just select anybody that is placed in 
front of him.165  This is analogous to the identification made in 
Biggers, in which the witness refrained from identifying anyone in 
the photos and show-ups for seven months before selecting the right 
man.166  The Court in Biggers, along with the court in Bolden, held 
that the identifications were reliable, and therefore admissible.167 
In Sharp, the victim of the robbery, as the sole eyewitness, 
 
160 Id. at 200 (emphasis added). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 201. 
163 Id. at 200. 
164 Bolden, 445 N.E.2d at 200. 
165 Id. 
166 Biggers, 409 U.S. at 194-95. 
167 Id. at 200-01; Bolden, 445 N.E.2d at 199 (majority opinion).  The defendant’s convic-
tion in Bolden was affirmed on different grounds, but the concurring opinion discussed the 
negative identification issue.  Id. at 200 (concurring opinion).  The Court of Appeals did not 
adopt the concurrence at that time; however, lower courts presented with negative identifica-
tion issues have adopted the concurring opinion in Bolden.  Id.; see, e.g., People v. White, 
572 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842-43 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (holding negative identification evidence admis-
sible where it “bears directly upon the credibility of the affirmative identification defense”). 
21
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identified the defendant out of several pictures shown to him by the 
police from the New York City Police Department’s photo manager 
system.168  Furthermore, he identified the defendant in a (presumably) 
non-suggestive lineup, which took place one day after the photo array 
and eleven days after the actual robbery.169  The fact that the witness 
in Sharp made no incorrect identification lends ample support for the 
proposition that he was certain about the identity of the defendant, a 
certainty comparable to that of the witnesses in Biggers and Bolden.  
The more certain a witness is about an identification, the more credi-
ble he becomes as a witness and the more reliable the resulting evi-
dence will be.170 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
People v. Sharp presents an issue of first impression in New 
York as to whether a proposed second lineup would create undue 
suggestiveness in and of itself.  Both federal and state case law offer 
persuasive authority to support the proposition that it would not be 
unduly suggestive.  The absence of counsel at the first lineup in no 
way affected the reliability of the witness.  To further safeguard the 
defendant’s constitutional rights, a hearing was ordered to determine 
whether the complainant had an independent source with which to 
make a proper identification.  Assuming, arguendo, that the People 
can sustain their burden at the hearing, the court’s allowance of a se-
cond lineup is equitable and in accordance with case authority as well 





168 Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 780.  The number of photos viewed by the witness is unknown, 
but will presumably be brought to light at the Wade hearing. 
169 Id. at 780-81. 
170 See generally Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (holding reliable evidence to be admissible); 
Sharp, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 785 (stating that a pretrial lineup will make an identification more 
reliable). 
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